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Background
The digital age is set to experience the production of more than 163
zettabytes (i.e., one-trillion gigabytes) of data per year by 2025, much of
which will be consumer-specific.1 Over the past decade, downloads of
mobile health (mHealth) apps and wearables have been on the rise year after
year.2 mHealth apps include both medical apps, and health and fitness apps.3
mHealth apps run on phones and wearables. Consequently, since wearables
gather health information on their users, they will increasingly become a
source of data creation.
Technology firms increasingly want a bigger share of the more than
three trillion dollars spent annually on health care in the United States.4 65%
of smartphone users have an mHealth app on their phone.5 The wearables
market is expected to experience significant growth.6 The combination of
mHealth apps and wearables may support consumers in their pursuit of

1. Andrew Cave, What Will We Do When The World’s Data Hit’s 163 Zettabytes in 2025?,
FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewcave/2017/04/13/what-will-we-do-when-theworlds-data-hits-163-zettabytes-in-2025/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
2. Aaron Smith, Record shares of Americans now Own smartphones, have home broadband,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/12/evolution-oftechnology/; see also Lionel Sujay Vailshery, Statistical Report, Number of connected wearable
devices worldwide by region from 2015 to 2022, STATISTA (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/490231/wearable-devices-worldwide-by-region/.
3. mHealth Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report By Component (Wearables,
mHealth Apps), By Service (Monitoring, Diagnosis), By Participant (Mobile Operators, Device
Vendors), By Region, And Segment Forecasts, 2020 – 2027, GRAND VIEW RSCH. (Feb. 2020),
https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/mhealth-market (last visited Apr. 19,
2020).
4. Natasha Singer, How Big Tech Is Going After Your Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/26/technology/big-tech-health-care.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2020).
5. Mindsea Team, 28 Mobile App Statistics To Know In 2021, MINDSEA,
https://mindsea.com/app-stats/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
6. Wearable Devices Market 2019 Size, Industry Share, Approaches and Forecast By 2024
- Market Research Engine, MARKETWATCH, https://www.marketwatch.com/pressrelease/wearable-devices-market-2019-size-industry-share-approaches-and-forecast-by-2024—market-research-engine-2019-09-24 (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) (In 2019, the wearables market
was valued at $67 billion; and, the mHealth market was valued at $40.7 billion); INT’L DATA CORP.,
Worldwide Wearables Market Braces for Short-Term Impact Before Recovery in 2020, According
to
IDC,
INT’L
DATA
CORP.
(Mar.
16.
2020),
https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS46138520 (The global wearables market is
expected to grow 9.4% in 2020, reaching 368.2 million shipments); Sarah Kellogg, Every Breath
You Take: Data Privacy and Your Wearable Fitness Device, 72 J. OF THE MO. BAR 76, 77 (2018)
(This is up from 30.9 million shipments in 2015).
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health goals, such as weight management,7 stress management,8 smoking
cessation,9 self-management of health conditions,10 and, more recently,
social-distancing measures in light of COVID-19.11 Wearables with sensors
can collect bodily metrics such as glucose levels, blood pressure, blood
oxygen levels, sleep patterns, and blood coagulation rates.12 In all, these
broad sets of data are highly attractive to data brokers, technology firms,
advertising firms, and the medical community.
Precision medicine is the promise of better treatment outcomes when
consumers use apps that create a precise record of their symptoms and
behaviors. In 2015, President Obama announced the launch of the Precision
Medicine Initiative.13 Until recently, medical treatments were designed for
the “average patient” – a “one-size-fits-all” approach. “Precision medicine
. . . is an innovative approach that takes into account individual differences
in people’s genes, environments, and lifestyles.”14 Wearables gather
information about the user’s lifestyle to create a data set to develop precision
medicine.
Medical apps and wearables gather sensitive and private information,
often without the user’s knowledge. The private information that a user
enters into medical apps or that is collected through a wearable’s sensors is
also collected, shared, or sold, often without the user’s knowledge or
consent.15 A Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study released in May 2014,
revealed that just 12 mobile health applications and devices transmitted
information to 76 different third parties, and some of the data could be linked

7. Brianna Elliott, The 10 Best Weight Loss Apps That Help You Shed Pounds, HEALTHLINE
(June 17, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/nutrition/10-best-weight-loss-apps.
8. Lizzy Francis, 10 Stress Management Apps to Help During Hard Times, YAHOO!LIFE
(Mar.
24,
2020),
https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/10-stress-management-apps-help191014172.html.
9. Tim Jewell, The Best Quit Smoking Apps of 2020, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 25, 2020),
https://www.healthline.com/health/quit-smoking/top-iphone-android-apps.
10. Technical Brief 31, Mobile Applications for Self-Management of Diabetes, SCI. RES.
CTR.,
(May
8,
2018),
https://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/products/diabetes-mobiledevices/technical-brief.
11. Eliza Strickland, An Official WHO Coronavirus App Will Be a “Waze for COVID-19”,
IEEE
SPECTRUM
(Mar.
20,
2020),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-humanos/biomedical/devices/who-official-coronavirus-app-waze-covid19.
12. Philip Brunkard, Data Privacy And Wearables In Health, DISRUPTION HUB (Apr. 25,
2018), https://disruptionhub.com/wearables-health-data-bt-philip-brunkard-1653/.
13. The
Precision
Medicine
Initiative,
WHITE
HOUSE,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/precision-medicine (last visited Sept. 21, 2021).
14. Id.
15. Jay Hancock, Workplace wellness programs put employee privacy at risk, CNN HEALTH
(Oct. 2, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/28/health/workplace-wellness-privacy-riskexclusive/index.html.
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back to specific users.16 In addition, 18 third parties received device-specific
identifiers, and 22 received other key health information.17 According to
Michelle De Mooy, Deputy Director of the Consumer Privacy Project at the
Center for Democracy & Technology, a Washington, D.C. based nonprofit
that advocates for civil liberties and human rights on the internet, “health
data is more vulnerable in general as a data set than financial data because
you can’t replace it like you can a credit card.”18
The larger context reveals the harvesting and monetization of a great
deal of our personal information. As FTC Commissioner, Julie Brill noted,
“information about some of the most sensitive aspects of our lives is
available for analysts to examine without our knowledge or consent.”19 With
today’s ever-expanding use of technology and the ease with which highly
intimate and sensitive information may be acquired and compiled, personal
information sometimes may not feel private at all.20 The FTC has recognized
that data brokers consolidate aggregate personally identifiable information
(PII) for the purpose of utilizing predictive analytics to discriminate among
consumers regarding their race, economic status, and propensity to default
or engage in crime.21 One data broker’s database has information on 1.4
billion consumer transactions and over seven hundred billion aggregated
data elements; another covers one trillion dollars in consumer transactions;
and another adds three billion new records each month.22 Within these large
data brokers, individual profiles have been created on nearly every U.S.

16. Kellog, supra note 8.
17. Id.
18. Sarah Kellogg, Every Breath You Take: Data Privacy and Your Wearable Fitness Device,
72 J. MO. B. 76 (2016).
19. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 23rd Computers
Freedom and Privacy Conference: Reclaim Your Name (June 26, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/reclaim-yourname/130626computersfreedom.pdf.
20. Lauren Newman, Keep Your Friends Close and Your Medical Records Closer: Defining
the Extent to Which a Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy Protects Medical Records, 32
J. OF L. AND HEALTH 2; see also Lori Andrews, Use a Health or Medical App? Your Data is Rarely
Private, CHICAGO TRIB. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ctmedical-apps-health-privacy-hipaa-perspec-0804-md-20160803-story.html.
21. See generally Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, FTC Rep. 8, 46
(2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparencyaccountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
22. Id. at 46-47.
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consumer for the purpose of discriminating between them.23 The information
processing by these data brokers is not sufficiently regulated.24
This article will examine the various agencies and statutes that
regulate—or fall short of regulating—medical privacy in wearables, and it
will also consider the unique privacy concerns of wearables and mHealth
apps. Next, this paper will survey the legislative and regulatory landscape to
consider the protections afforded to users or lack thereof. Unlike other
nations, the privacy legal regime in the United States is highly sectoral,
focusing on privacy in particular industries rather than an overall privacy
framework. Thus, this paper will consider several pertinent federal laws: the
Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act, the Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Act, and the Stored Communications Act. Next, the paper
will consider the authority of the FTC and Food and Drug Administration to
regulate in this space and what actions they have taken so far. Additionally,
contracts law is a common thread between congressional acts and
administrative agencies, so this paper will consider contractual issues that
users are bound to, and how a user’s “consent” (actual or fictive) allows
companies to continue with business practices that imperil users. This paper
will further consider security and data breach issues with medical
information, specifically the balance between privacy concerns with the
potential benefits to the medical community, via precision medicine. Lastly,
the paper addresses the benefits and costs of wearables used for contact
tracing and symptom diagnosis in light of COVID-19.
The widespread adoption and use of software technologies is opening
new and innovative ways that may improve health and health care delivery,
but potentially at the cost of substantial invasions of privacy. Some argue
that regulation of wearables would stifle innovation and is premature, while
others argue new regulation is required now to protect consumers. This paper
analyzes how the federal legal framework allows for innovation, regulation,
or neither.

23. Id. at 46.
24. See Mark Andrus, The New Oil: The Right to Control One’s Identity in Light of the
Commoditization
of
the
Individual,
AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept.
28,
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/09/06_andrus/.
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Part I: Introduction to Wearables
A. Wearable Technology and Its Function

The wearables market can be broken down into four areas: hearables,
smartwatches, wristbands, and “other”.25 Hearables, as defined by the
International Data Corporation, are the wearables that hang on or plug into
the ear.26 The device must operate wirelessly and provide stereo sound, while
also including at least one of the following features: track health/fitness,
modify audio (not just noise reduction), provide language translation on the
device, or enable smart assistants.27 Hearables are expected to grow with a
five-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10.3%, reaching 301.5
million units by 2024. 28 IDC believes hearables are on the cusp of offering
health and fitness tracking that would be on par with, or perhaps even better
than what, is currently offered on the wrist, since the stationary position of
hearables makes them a prime candidate to gather consistent health and
fitness data from up and coming sensors.29
As for smartwatches and wristbands, these devices include Apple
Watches or Fitbits. Lastly, the “other” category is everything else, including
smart garments. Because sensors have become inexpensive, manufacturers
are including them in increasingly more products, such as smart socks, sports
bras, smart bikinis, smart suits (by Samsung), smart glasses, yoga pants, and
so on.30 With the growing variety of wearables, a person’s body has become
valuable real estate for corporations and app developers to gather their
personal information.
B. Scope, Nature, and Context of Data Collected by Wearables

The scope and nature of data collection by apps, wearables, and third
parties is substantially broad and significant. Medical apps collect
information about the user’s thoughts, actions, moods, sex life, responses to
interventions,31 age, name, email address, gender, height, weight, hydration,
25. Michael Shirer, Worldwide Wearables Market Braces for Short-Term Impact Before
Recovery in 2020, According to IDC, INT’L DATA CORP. (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS46138520.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Michael Sawh, The best smart clothing: From biometric shirts to contactless payment
jackets, WAREABLE (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.wareable.com/smart-clothing/best-smartclothing.
31. See, e.g., AppAdvice, DBSA Wellness Tracker: Depression and Bipolar Support Alliance,
APPADVICE, https://appadvice.com/app/dbsa-wellness-tracker/638583516 (last visited Mar. 22,
2020).
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diet,32 exercise habits,33 online and in-store purchases, whether the user has
cable television, who the user phones most frequently, and geolocation.34
Additionally, data collection is done both actively and passively.35 Through
passive data collection, apps can detect symptoms of COVID-19,36 the
common flu,37 drug overdoses,38 Alzheimer’s disease,39 and Huntington’s
disease.40 By analyzing such symptoms, the technology might identify a
health problem before the user is aware of it. Through measurements of gait,
voice, speed, and geolocation, tracking apps and wearables can detect minor
changes in the way a user walks, speaks or moves.41 This might also result
in a diagnosis.
This data collection of wearables and mHealth apps has the potential of
providing timely notice to enact preventative care, mitigation strategies, and
medical planning for users. Additionally, the amount and type of data
collected might be helpful to doctors in understanding and detecting varying
medical conditions, which could lead to the development of medicines,

32. See, e.g., 9 Nutrition and Diet Apps for 2020, KAISER PERMANENTE, https://wahealth.kaiserpermanente.org/best-diet-apps/.
33. See, e.g., Cat Ellis, The 10 Best Home Workout Apps, TECHRADAR (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.techradar.com/best/home-workout-apps.
34. See, e.g., Ashley Hall, 5 Ways to Track Your Personal Health on Your Phone,
VERYWELLHEALTH (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.verywellhealth.com/track-health-informationphone-1739148.
35. See Alexander Seifert, Mobile Data Collection: Smart, but Not (Yet) Smart Enough, NAT.
CTR FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY (Dec. 18, 2018), at 1; see also Liat Clark, This App Passively Tracks
Your Mental Health, WIRED (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/diagnosingdepression-with-an-app. The app strips raw data from the phone’s microphone, accelerometer, light
sensor and location sensors and runs it through a machine learning algorithm to find patterns in
sleep, conversation and activity data.
36. See Eric Wicklund, Scripps Turns to mHealth Wearables to Help Plot Coronavirus
Growth, MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 25, 2020), https://mhealthintelligence.com/news/scrippsturns-to-mhealth-wearables-to-help-plot-coronavirus-growth.
37. Id.
38. See Angela Chen, New smartphone app can detect overdoses and call for help, THE
VERGE (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/10/18176994/opioid-overdose-appsonar-detection-smartphone-technology-science-second-chances.
39. See Gina Jordan, How A Mobile App May Someday Help Diagnose Alzheimer’s Disease,
WGCU PUBLIC MEDIA (Oct. 17, 2013), https://news.wgcu.org/post/how-mobile-app-maysomeday-help-diagnose-alzheimers-disease.
40. See id.; Forest Ray, Wearable Devices May Aid Diagnosis, But Need Improvement,
HUNTINGTON’S
DISEASE
NEWS
(Mar.
2,
2021),
https://huntingtonsdiseasenews.com/2021/03/02/wearable-devices-may-aid-huntingtonsdiagnosis-but-evaluation-studies-need-improvement-review-finds/.
41. See Id.; see also Jung Hung Chien, The use of smartphone in measuring stance and gait
patterns in patients with orthostatic tremor, PLOS ONE, July 18, 2019, at 2; see also Robert J. Ellis,
A Validated Smartphone-Based Assessment of Gait and Gait Variability in Parkinson’s Disease,
PLOS ONE, Oct. 30, 2015, at 1-2.

28

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 13:1

preventive care, and pharmaceuticals.42 However, despite mHealth apps’
potential benefits, the use of these tools has been limited, as most people stop
using them after a short period of time.43 Wearables, on the other hand, are
not as easily discarded because they serve a particular valued function, e.g.,
telling time or listening to music. Unlike phone apps, the continued use of
smartwatches, ear pods, wristbands, and smart clothes may withstand the
pitfalls of apps, which means their data collection would continue. However,
it is not yet certain whether the potential benefits of wearables will result in
better health outcomes for their users.
Nevertheless, potential health benefits of wearables need to be balanced
against privacy concerns. Existing data-collection efforts by private parties
such as data brokers and aggregators, search engines, and social media giants
far exceed anything that Congress has attempted to regulate in consumerprotection statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) or other
consumer-protection statutes.44 Because of the lack of legislation and
regulation regarding wearable-generated health data, companies sell this
information to data aggregators and brokers with impunity.45 The sharing of
this sensitive, medical information can lead to higher insurance rates or job
discrimination. 46 Dr. Jesse M. Ehrenfeld, chair of the American Medical
Association board, stated, “patients simply may not realize that their genetic,
reproductive health, substance abuse disorder, [and] mental health
information can be used in ways that could ultimately limit their access to
health insurance, life insurance, or even be disclosed to their employer.…
Patient privacy can’t be retrieved once it’s lost.”47
Companies have long processed consumer data in order to deliver
targeted ads—and thereby intruded on consumer privacy. To illustrate how
this personal information eerily impacted one unsuspecting father, one needs
only look so far as a Target located in Minneapolis. After receiving a Target
ad, a father angrily stormed into a Target. He demanded to know from the
manager why his daughter, who was still in high school, was receiving ads
for maternity clothing and nursery furniture – it turned out that his daughter

42. See Ellis, supra at 2.
43. See Gunther Eysenbach, The Continued Use of Mobile Health Apps: Insights From a
Longitudinal Study, JMIR MHEALTH UHEALTH, Aug. 2019, at 1.
44. Andrus, supra note 23.
45. Natasha Singer, When Apps Get Your Medical Data, Your Privacy May Go With It, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/technology/smartphone-medicalrecords.html.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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was in fact pregnant.48 Target created an algorithm that used items purchased
to predict when a consumer was pregnant, including an accurate prediction
of their due date.49 In this instance, Target’s algorithm analyzed women’s
purchases of a combination of unscented lotion, cotton balls, and mineral
supplements.50 The combination of behaviors may go overlooked to a user,
but could be gold for a company because it provides them with data to deliver
a precisely timed advertisement that can change someone’s shopping
patterns at a pivotal moment, potentially resulting in changed shopping
behavior for years.51
The privacy risks are heightened with health data. A patient who uses a
health app or wearable might be unaware of their symptoms, or the diagnosis
based on those symptoms. The device, however, can document the
symptoms, or even make a diagnosis, and then transmit all that information
to a third party. Unsurprisingly, the value of medical information on the
black market is fifty times that of credit card information.52
The context of how wearables and apps collect sensitive health
information is also important. Traditionally, disclosure of medical
information from a client to a doctor occurred in the privacy of her office.
The client had control over what symptoms or information they chose to
disclose. As for doctors, there are substantial regulations that they must
adhere to. First, doctors swear to an ethical standard when they make the
Hippocratic oath.53 There is a doctor-patient confidentiality relationship that
a doctor is bound to uphold through both common law and state statutes.54
Additionally, doctors are bound by common law doctrines of privacy,

48. Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did,
FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-targetfigured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#45d8b7896668.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html.
52. See Consumer Reports, Hackers Can Profit Greatly by Stealing Your Health Data. Are
You Protected?, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/hackers-can-profitgreatlyby-stealing-your-health-data-are-you-protected/2015/11/09/e1f126f6-5181-11e5-933e7d06c647a395_story.html?utm_term=.ccf13bc3b1c3.
53. The Hippocratic Oath, INDIAN J. OF MED. ETHICS (Aug. 1, 1993),
https://ijme.in/articles/the-hippocratic-oath/?galley=html.
54. Doctor Patient Confidentiality, USLEGAL, https://healthcare.uslegal.com/doctor-patientconfidentiality/.
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fiduciary duty,55 contract, negligence,56 and warranty.57 Thus, if a doctor
violates patient privacy, they can be fined, penalized, or held civilly liable.
These safeguards engender trust, which is essential for prevention, diagnosis,
and treatment. These safeguards are not present with wearables, which are
made by companies not covered by doctor-patient privacy rules.

Part II: Sectoral Privacy Laws in the United States
A. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

When dealing with medical information, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is the first piece of federal
legislation to consider. The Act’s focus is on the health industry. In 1996,
Congress enacted HIPAA to safeguard health information while also
encouraging doctors to move to electronic files.58 Further, HIPAA’s purpose
is to improve the Federal Medicare and Medicaid programs as well as the
efficiency and effectiveness of the health information system through the
establishment of standards and requirements.59
These standards include notice, protecting personal health information
(PHI), and proper release of PHI.60 PHI includes any individually identifiable
information maintained or transmitted by a “covered entity” or a “business
associate” that relates to an individual’s physical or mental health or the
provisions of or payment for healthcare.61 HIPAA defines a “covered entity”
as healthcare providers, health plans, or healthcare clearing houses who
electronically transmit any health information in connection with a
transaction covered by HIPAA.62 A covered entity must comply with HIPAA
Rule requirements. A “business associate” is defined as a person or entity
that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits PHI on behalf of a covered

55. Jeff Brown, Doctors owe their patients some fiduciary responsibility, KEVINMD.COM
(Jan.
7,
2010),
https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2010/01/doctors-owe-patients-fiduciaryresponsibility.html.
56. Frank C. Spencer, The Medical Malpractice Crisis, ETHICS J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N
Vol. 7, No. 4 (April 2004), available at https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/malpracticecrisis/2005-04.
57. Duty of physician—Basis of duty—Warranty, 3 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation
§ 24:17 (2d ed.).
58. See generally Shaun G. Jamison, Creating A National Data Privacy Law for the United
States, 10 CYBARIS AN INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 10 (2019).
59. Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
60. Jamison, supra note 55.
61. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014). See generally Cristina M. Mares, To Cover or Not to Cover?
The Relationship Between the Apple Watch and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, 18 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 159, 162 (2016).
62. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining “covered entity”).
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entity.63 A covered entity that engages a business associate must have a
written contract that specifically establishes what the business associate has
been engaged to do and requires the business associate’s compliance with
HIPAA.64
Generally, a company that develops, sells, or manufactures an mHealth
app or wearable does not qualify as a HIPAA-covered entity. Such a
company typically is not a medical provider, health plan, or health
clearinghouse. Nor are they considered business associates because they do
not communicate information to a covered entity.65
Nonetheless, some aspects of mHealth apps and wearables may require
HIPAA compliance. For example, every iPhone comes with particular apps
pre-installed, including Health and MyChart.66 The Health app is a fitness
tracker that counts steps and measures walking and running distances. When
paired with an Apple Watch, this app automatically tracks activity data.67
MyChart provides fast, secure access to a users’ medical records, the ability
to send private messages to physicians and other health providers, to see
upcoming and past appointments, to view and pay medical bills, to get lab
results, and to pull health-related data from personal devices right into
MyChart.68 The federal government is working to complete rules to require
health providers to send medical information to third-party apps, like
MyChart, after a patient has authorized the data exchange. 69 HIPAA would
potentially apply to MyChart if it communicates PHI to a health service

63. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (declaring the meaning of “business associate”).
64. See Mares, supra note 59 (describing the scope of data collection for a “business
associate”).
65. Kellog, supra note 6 at 2; see also Mark D. Rasch, Privacy and Security in the InternetConnected World of Precision Medicine, ABA SCITECH LAW., Fall 2018, at 18, 21; but see Fred
Donovan, How Does HIPAA Apply to Wearable Health Technology, HEALTHITSECURITY (July
24,
2018),
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/how-does-hipaa-apply-to-wearable-healthtechnology.
66. Erik Lorenzsonn, Apple steps into Epic Systems’ arena with medical records iPhone, CAP.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://madison.com/ct/business/technology/apple-steps-into-epic-systemsarena-with-medical-records-iphone/article_3875e65b-2cb1-5ceb-9e6d-601fa66af77b.html.
67. User Directions, Use the Health app on your iPhone or iPod touch, APPLE (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203037.
68. Apple,
MyChart,
App
Store
Preview,
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/mychart/id382952264#?platform=appleWatch (last visited Apr. 19,
2020).
69. Singer, supra note 42. (“The regulations are part of a government effort to push health
providers to use and share electronic health records. Regulators have long hoped that centralizing
medical data online would let doctors get a fuller, more accurate picture of patient health and help
people make more informed medical choices, with the promise of better health outcomes. Dr.
Rucker, of the federal health department’s national coordinator for health information technology,
said it was self-serving for physicians and hospitals, which may benefit financially from keeping
patients and their data captive, to play up privacy concerns.”).
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provider. On the other hand, if the PHI remains on the phone or is
communicated to a party other than a service provider, the data is not
protected by HIPAA.
For another example of how HIPAA might apply to mHealth, consider
the 2017 agreement between the National Football League Players
Association (NFLPA) and Whoop, a wearable-technology company.70 An
officially licensed NFLPA wearable is provided to each NFL player with the
goal of studying the effects of travel, sleep, scheduling, and injuries on
players’ recovery.71 The goal is to provide players, trainers, and coaches with
a detailed analysis of a player’s body preparedness, while ensuring each
player owns and controls his data.72 With the data collected, trainers and
coaches can customize a player’s training.
With such a large amount of sensitive data of high-profile individuals,
does HIPAA apply? Well, each club is required to have board-certified
medical personnel, which are required to comply with local, state, and
federal law.73 Thus, each football team likely qualifies as a covered entity.
The information collected from the wearable did not stay on the device, but
rather was transmitted to the trainers, doctors, and coaches, which is
essentially the team, a covered entity. Therefore, HIPAA likely applies. If,
however, the information remained on the device, it would not be
communicated to a covered entity and would not be protected by HIPAA.
As to Whoop, it would be considered a business associate of each team, so
the information it collects would also be covered by HIPAA. Further, even
if the information were not protected by HIPAA, Whoop entered into a
contractual agreement with the players wherein each player owns their
information.
However, the average consumer of wearables is not an NFL player with
a team of doctors that triggers HIPAA, or is not engaged contractual
relationship that provides ownership of data. Regarding the NFLPA, Whoop
was likely incentivized to provide these significant protections to gain
publicity in order to increase sales and profit. The protections afforded to
NFLPA vary drastically from the terms for ordinary users. 74 Thus, although
70. Terence M. Durkin, Health Data Privacy and Security in the Age of Wearable Tech:
Privacy and Security Concerns for the NFLPA and Whoop, 19 J. HIGH TECH. L. 279, 281 (2019).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 282.
73. Id. at 297.
74. Terms of Use, WHOOP, https://healthitsecurity.com/news/how-does-hipaa-apply-towearable-health-technology (last visited May 5, 2020) (Whoops’ term of use state: “By submitting
the User Content to us, you hereby grant us a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free,
sublicenseable and transferable license to edit, modify, truncate, aggregate, use, reproduce,
distribute, prepare derivative works of, modify, display, perform, publish and otherwise
commercially exploit all or any portion of the User Content in connection with our provision of the
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Whoop is capable of providing significant protections to all users, as they
did with the NFLPA, they generally do not.
To implement HIPAA, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) issued regulations regarding the protection of PHI, known as the
“Privacy Rule.”75 In 2009, the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) expanded HIPAA protections. For
example, it requires covered entities to notify clients regarding breaches of
unsecured information and make certain HIPAA privacy requirements
applicable to business associates.76 Like HIPAA itself, the Privacy Rule
extends only to covered entities and business associates.77
Additionally, HHS issued the “Security Rule” to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PHI when it is stored,
maintained, or transmitted.78 The Security Rule requires that covered entities
protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security
or integrity of the PHI. It also provides that certain uses or disclosures of PHI
are not permitted or required.79 Covered entities are liable for improperly
disclosed PHI pursuant to HIPAA, whether disclosure was intentional or
merely negligent.80 The Privacy Rule and Security Rule work hand-in-hand
in the event of a security breach.
The consequences of a security breach or hack of a wearable can be
devastating to a user since medical, geolocation, and other information may
be stored on the device. However, because most wearables are not currently
covered by HIPAA, the Security Rule and Privacy Rule do not apply.
Wearables have significant security vulnerabilities. For example, wearables
connect to a phone via Bluetooth, and Bluetooth connectivity provides an
avenue for a hacker to infiltrate. Security researcher Axelle Apvrille claims
she was able to hack a Fitbit bracelet in 10 seconds from 15 feet away.81 Yet,
Services and our (and our successors’) business, including without limitation for promoting and
redistributing part or all of the Services (and derivative works thereof) in any media formats and
through any media channels and sharing the User Content with social media platforms (i.e., posting
User Content to Twitter or Facebook if enabled in your Account’s sharing settings) with our
business partners and licensees for informational and analytical purposes. If your use of the
Services is on behalf of or managed by a coach, team, organizing body or other entity you are
affiliated with (“Managing Entity”), your User Content may also be shared with that team or other
organization as more fully described in our Privacy Policy.” With these terms, Whoop essentially
acquires complete ownership of the users data.).
75. HIPAA Privacy Rule, Practical Law Practice Note 4-501-7220 (1996).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. HIPAA Security Rule, Practical Law Practice Note 5-502-1269 (1996).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Alexandra Burlacu, Experts Warn It Just Takes 10 Seconds to Hack Fitbit Fitness
Trackers:
Here’s
Fitbit’s
Response,
TECH
TIMES
(Oct.
24,
2015),
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HIPAA does not apply to a wearable breach unless there is some connection
or transmission to a covered entity.
Ultimately, with minor exceptions, HIPAA does not cover wearables.
Wearables are capable of gathering a vast amount of sensitive health
information that can jeopardize the future of a consumer once the
information is sold or shared with a third-party that is not a covered entity or
business associate.
B. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act

In 1998, Congress enacted the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA). This act stems from the public policy of protecting children
because they are a vulnerable population.82 COPPA requires parental consent
before certain types of information is collected about their children, while
completely barring collection of other types of information.83
Under COPPA, any website either directed at children (under 13 years
of age) or knowingly collecting personal information from such children
must: (1) “provide notice on the website of what information is collected
from children by the operator, how the operator uses such information, and
the operator’s disclosure practices for such information”; and (2) “obtain
verifiable parental consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal
information from children.”84 Additionally, at a parent’s request, a website
must describe what type of personal information was collected from that
parent’s child, give that parent the opportunity to bar the website’s further
use of the information collected, and give the parent access to the
information.85 Companies also may not require a child to submit more
information than is reasonably necessary.86 In 2019, the FTC and YouTube
reached a $170 million settlement for alleged COPPA violations.87 The FTC
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/98427/20151024/experts-warn-it-just-takes-10-seconds-tohackfitbit-fitness-trackers-heres-fitbits-response.htm.
82. See Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FTC (Mar. 20, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-askedquestions#General%20Questions.
83. HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 74; see also Jamison, supra note 57, at 8.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii)(1998).
85. Id.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(C); see also Yelp, TinyCo Settle FTC Charges Their Apps
Improperly Collected Children’s Personal Information, FTC (Sept. 17, 2014)
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/09/yelp-tinyco-settle-ftc-charges-theirapps-improperly-collected (Tinyco, a games developer, failed to comply with COPAA
requirements by requiring children to provide an email address for extra game points. In another
case, Yelp was aware that children were using its app and website, resulting in Yelp adopting an
age gate for access. Yelp, however, implemented the age gate incorrectly).
87. Google and YouTube Will Pay Record $170 Million for Alleged Violations of Children’s
Privacy
Law,
FTC
(Sept.
4,
2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-

Winter 2022

PRIVACY IN WEARABLES

35

and New York Attorney General had alleged YouTube used cookies on
viewers of child-directed channels, without first notifying parents and
obtaining consent.88 The COPPA Rule addresses persistent identifiers like
cookies that track a user’s internet browsing habits for targeted advertising.89
With the popularity of wearables and the trajectory of market
expansion,90 the wearables market may increasingly cater to a younger
audience. Children’s wearables currently include GPS trackers, baby
monitors, fitness trackers,91 smart rings, watches, and bracelets.92 In
developing this technology, companies should give special attention to the
privacy interests of children. Developers have an opportunity to consider
privacy from the inception of the device and incorporate privacy solutions at
the hardware level. Yet, many companies have foregone this opportunity. 93
Although COPPA requires parental consent, once this consent is
obtained, the company can then use, store, or sell the information collected.
Consent is often obtained through the all too familiar “clickwrap” agreement,
which comes in the form of a contract or terms of use followed by with words
“I accept” and a small checkbox. Courts generally find clickwrap agreements
to be enforceable because they necessitate an active role by the user.94
However, the privacy policies that companies provide to parents are often
lengthy, confusing, and tend to obfuscate and bury how data storage and
collection actually operate.95 This makes it exceptionally difficult for
consumers to understand how features on a device, and the information
collected therein, operate and relate to the privacy policy.96 Studies show that
74% of adults skip privacy policies and simply agree to the terms without

releases/2019/09/google-youtube-will-pay-record-170-million-alleged-violations. (The settlement
also requires YouTube develop, implement, and maintain a system that permits channel owners to
identify their child-directed content so that YouTube can ensure it is complying with COPPA.)
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Shirer, supra note 24.
91. Fitbit, Ace 2, FIBTBIT STORE, https://www.fitbit.com/us/products/trackers/ace2 (last
visited Apr. 20, 2020).
92. Safety Team, Safety.com’s Top 10 Wearables for Kids, SAFETY.COM (Mar. 9, 2020),
https://www.safety.com/best-wearables/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2020).
93. Husain Sumra, Kids smartwatch makers are in trouble for collecting data without
permission, WAREABLE (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.wareable.com/smartwatches/gator-tinitellftc-warning-kids-data-2018.
94. Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
95. James Gilmore, Securing the Kids: Geofencing and Child Wearables, 26 CONVERGENCE
INT. J. OF RSCH. INTO NEW MEDIA TECH. 1333, 1340-41 (2019).
96. Id.
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reading them.97 For example, Jiobit, a children’s GPS device, stresses that
geolocation data is never shared for marketing purposes, but then states in
their privacy policy that personal information could be shared with “‘third
parties who may contact you about our products and services that may be of
interest to you, as well as incorporating interest-based ads . . . presented to
you based on your browsing behavior in order to provide you with ads more
tailored to your interest.”98
Thus, with parental consent, children’s data can be used for marketing
purposes, and even sold. Nevertheless, so-called “consent” to such
processing of children’s mHealth data will often not be genuine consent. The
terms of use agreements incorporate complicated privacy policies that
parents often click through without actually understanding. Because terms
of use agreements bury important terms within clickwrap agreements, true
informed consent is often not obtained. Courts are upholding these
agreements because the user plays an active role in providing consent.99
Consequently, a datafication of children is occurring despite COPPA.
Additionally, because COPPA requires parental consent, children lack
agency in the decision to assent to the terms of use of the wearable. The
assumption is that parents are better positioned to make this decision, but
this assumption is questionable with complex privacy policies and terms of
use. The gap between the purpose of COPPA and reality can potentially be
addressed by designing privacy features from inception or, at the least, draft
plain English privacy policies that require more than checking a box.
C. Stored Communications Act

Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA).100 ECPA includes the Stored Communications Act (SCA).101 The
SCA is an important statutory protection of the privacy of digital
communications and data.102 It regulates two kinds of entities: “remote
computing services” (RCS), which provide computer storage or processing
services by means of an electronic communication system; and “electronic
97. Oeldorf-Hirsch et al., Overwhelming, Important, Irrelevant: Terms of Service and Privacy
Policy Reading Among Older Adults, 2019 SMSociety ‘19: Proc. of the 10th Int’l Conf. on Soc.
Media and Soc’y. 166, 169.
98. Gilmore, supra note 94, at 1341.
99. Compare with Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 2014).
Courts have generally not enforced browsewrap agreements because users do not play an active
role in providing consent.
100. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 2510, 100 Stat.
1848 (amended 1986).
101. Id.
102. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).
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communications services” (ECS), which provide the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications.103 The SCA limits when such
entities can disclose two kinds of digital information: “contents,” which are
the substance or meaning of a communication; and “records,” which are
metadata, such as who wrote to whom and when.104 The SCA limits
disclosures of content to non-government entities, but does not limit
disclosures of records to non-government entities.105 The SCA requires a
warrant for disclosure of content to government and requires a court order
based on “reasonable grounds” of “relevance” to disclose records to the
government.106
The SCA applies to consumer wearables if the health app at issue
provides either an RCS or ECS.107 Particularly of importance, the SCA
restrictions only apply if the service is provided “to the public.” 108 Services
are provided “to the public” if they are generally available and not
exclusive.109 For example, social media is public because anyone can
download it, whereas internal networks at a corporation are non-public
because employment is required for access.
If the SCA applies to a wearable, the next question is whether the user’s
information is “content” or “records.” If a person uses a wearable to send a
text message, social media post, or email, that would probably be considered
“content.” On the other hand, if a wearable’s sensors generated information
about a user by monitoring their workout or geolocation, that would probably
be considered “records.” Most data collected from wearables would be
considered records and not content.110 Under the SCA, records can freely be
transmitted to third parties, including data brokers, without the users’
consent.111 Congress could protect user privacy in the context of wearables
by expanding the definition of “content” or increasing the protection of
“records.” However, even then, companies and developers could still
disclose wearable-generated consumer data with a user’s consent.112 As with
COPPA, this would require the ill-equipped user to interpret complicated

103. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2711(1)-(2); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(15).
104. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a); 18 U.S.C.A. 2510(8).
105. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)(3).
106. 18 U.S.C.A, §§ 2702(a), (b)(2), and (c)(1); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2703(a), (b), (c)(1)(B), (d).
107. Durkin, supra note 67 at 3.
108. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a). See also Kerr, supra note 155 at 1231.
109. Id. at 1226.
110. Durkin, supra note 67 at 3; see also Nayanika Challa, Wary About Wearables: Potential
for the Exploitation of Wearable Health Technology Through Employee Discrimination and Sales
to Third Parties, 10 No. 3 INTERSECT: THE STAN. J. OF SCI., TECH., AND SOC’Y (2017).
111. Kerr, supra note 102 at 1220-22.
112. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(3) & (c)(2); see also Kerr, infra note 162 at 1221.
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policies with little choice or leverage. Because of the complexity and
deliberate obfuscation of user agreements, such legal protection alone might
not be effective.

Part III: Administrative Regulation
Two administrative agencies, the Federal Trade Commission and the
Food and Drug Administration, have regulatory powers that relate to
mHealth. Unfortunately, neither has provided significant privacy protection
for users of wearable devices.
A. Federal Trade Commission Act

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the authority, per Section
Five of the FTC Act, to enforce cease-and-desist orders against any entity
for “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” that pertain to data management.113
Since the passage of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the FTC has
been the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement.114 In order
to act, the FTC analyzes whether the business act “causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition.”115 Deceptive acts or practices occur “if there
is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s
detriment.”116
The FTC’s approach to privacy protection can be illustrated by three of
its enforcement actions under Section Five, and by its development of “fair
information practice principles.” As explained below, these FTC measures
have not done enough to protect privacy, because they rely on users’ socalled “consent” to lengthy privacy policies that users cannot reasonably be
expected to understand. Thus, the FTC’s traditional approach to privacy
protection might not be sufficient to secure the vast amounts of sensitive
medical information already being generated by mHealth apps and
wearables.

113. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006). Outside of protecting
consumers, the FTC leads studies, facilitates workshops, and issues reports on technology related
topics. Annually, the FTC hosts Privacycon, where recent research on privacy and security issues
are presented by leading scholars, researchers, industry representatives, consumer advocates, and
the government.
114. Protecting Consumer Privacy and Security, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy-security (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
116. Zlotnick v. Premier Sales Grp., Inc., 480 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007).
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B. F.T.C v. Wyndham

In F.T.C. v. Wyndham, the case challenged 15 U.S.C. § 45 as being so
vague that it could not be enforced.117 The court held that this provision of
the FTC Act sufficiently informs parties that the relevant inquiry is a costbenefit analysis, which considers a number of relevant factors. These factors
include the probability and expected size of reasonably unavoidable harms
to consumers given a certain level of cybersecurity and the costs to
consumers that arise from investment in stronger cybersecurity.118
Additionally, the FTC’s authority to enforce privacy actions was
unsuccessfully challenged. This decision exemplifies that the FTC’s
authority is broad and applies to both cybersecurity and misleading privacy
policies.119
C. Goldenshores Technologies

In 2014, the FTC used its Section Five authority against Goldenshores
Technologies’ Brightest Flashlight Free app for deceiving customers. The
privacy policy allegedly did not reflect the app’s use of personal data and
presented consumers with a false choice on whether to share their
information.120 The FTC’s complaint asserted that the app was downloaded
tens of millions of times. The complaint also claimed that Goldenshores’
privacy policy did not adequately disclose that “the Brightest Flashlight App
transmits or allows the transmission of device data, including precise
geolocation along with persistent device identifiers, to third parties,
including advertising networks.”121 Under the settlement, Goldenshores was
prohibited from misrepresenting how consumers’ information is collected,
shared, and used; required to provide a just-in-time disclosure that “fully
informs consumers, when, how, and why their geolocation information is
being collected, used, and shared”; required to obtain consumers’ affirmative
consent; and required to delete any personal information collected through
the Brightest Flashlight app.122
The Goldenshores case illustrates that the FTC has authority to regulate
deceptive and fraudulent actions. Had Goldenshores fully disclosed their
data collection and business practices in their terms of use policy, they could

117. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 250 (3d Cir. 2015).
118. Id. at 255.
119. See Id.; see also Jamison, supra note 55.
120. FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges against Flashlight App Creator, FTC (Apr.
9,
2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-approves-final-ordersettling-charges-against-flashlight-app.
121. Complaint at 3, In re Goldenshores Techs., LLC, Erik M. Geidl, FTC No. 132-3087 (Dec.
5, 2013).
122. F.T.C., supra note 118.
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have avoided this FTC enforcement action. As such, the FTC is encouraging
full disclosure. This again shifts the responsibility to consumers, but
consumers are not always in the best position to interpret policies and
provide informed consent to such policies.
App permissions are typically confusing and unclear. Each app
typically has a list of permissions that are granted to the developer when the
user downloads an app to a device. Most app users do not understand
permissions and tend to avoid them when downloading and installing
apps.123 Even security experts find that permissions are sometimes
incomprehensible.124
Yet, permissions have serious consequences because many apps are
overprivileged and overreaching in a way that provides apps access to
information that do not correspond to the functionality of the app.125 For
example, most apps that obtain permission to track location do not need
location data to provide app functionality to the user.126 Other app
permissions authorize app developers to record audio, read contacts on the
phone, and take pictures.127 This information is a goldmine for companies
because they can then sell it to advertisers. In one study, experts found that
of 940 Android apps, nearly one-third had overreaching permissions.128
One distinguishing feature between these apps is whether it is a paid or
free app. In a study of 99 apps, researchers found that free apps included
more unnecessary permissions than paid apps.129 This difference is likely
attributable to the varying business models of how profits are derived; that
is, either from advertising revenue or directly from the user.
D. Trendnet

Trendnet is a California corporation that sells networking devices, such
as routers, modems, and internet protocol (IP) cameras, to home users and
mid-size businesses.130 From 2010 to 2012, Trendnet made a total revenue
123. Andrews, infra note 178, at 439.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 440.
126. Id. In another example, a diabetes recipe app allowed the app to “find user accounts on
the phone; read and modify contacts; read the calendar; track the user’s precise (GPS-based)
location; make phone calls; read and modify the call log; test access to and modify external storage;
obtain the device ID; activate the camera and microphone, and install and delete other applications.”
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 441.
130. Complaint at 2, In re Trendnet Inc., F.T.C. File No. 122 3090 (Jan. 16, 2014) (No. C-44),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140207trendnetcmpt.pdf; See also, Jessica
Kitain, Beware of Wearables: Protecting Privacy in A Data-Collecting World, 9 DREXEL L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 23 (2017).
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of $192 million, including $19 million from IP cameras.131 The function of
these cameras is to “conduct security monitoring of [a person’s] home or
business, by accessing live video or audio feeds from their cameras over the
internet.”132 Access to the camera requires login credentials, but this
requirement can be disabled.133 Trendnet described its IP cameras as
secure.134 For example, Trendnet affixes a sticker to the cameras packaging
of a lock with the capitalized word “SECURITY”.135
Yet Trendnet failed to provide a secure product, including failing to
implement even the most basic security measures.136 Trendnet stored “user
login credentials in clear, readable text over the internet,” “failed to
implement a security process to monitor security vulnerabilities,” and “failed
to employ reasonable and appropriate security in the design and testing.” 137
Because of their failings, hackers compromised hundreds of IP cameras and
posted live feeds for nearly 700 IP cameras.138 The live feeds displayed
“‘private areas of users’ homes and allowed the unauthorized surveillance of
infants sleeping in their cribs, young children playing, and adults engaging
in typical daily activities.”139
The FTC instituted a consent order composed of nine parts. Part I
forbids misleading consumers about the security of the device and security,
privacy, confidentiality, or integrity of any consumer information.140 Part II
requires Trendnet to maintain a security program to “(1) address security
risks that could result in unauthorized access to or use of Covered Device
Functionality, and (2) protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of
Covered Information.”141 Part III requires Trendnet to complete assessments
(by a third party) every other year to review compliance with the consent
order.142 Part IV requires Trendnet to notify consumers of camera and
security flaws, offer free and prompt support, and help consumers uninstall

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
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cameras.143 Parts V through IX require Trendnet to repeatedly report to the
FTC.144 The consent order will remain in effect for twenty years.145
Trendnet sets the baseline that companies must abide by to avoid FTC
actions for lack of security protections. Ultimately, providing security
protections helps both the consumer and the company. If consumers do not
feel secure with technology that collects sensitive information, consumers
will shift to another platform. Conversely, had the FTC not taken action, it
would have invited adverse companies into the marketplace that otherwise
could not develop appropriate security requirements, which would likely sell
at a lower price and undercut more secure technologies. Additionally,
consumers would likely not be in a position to discern between the security
features, which would result in potential security breaches of the home. The
home is an area courts hold to be where citizens have the most privacy
concerns.146
***
The three cases above illustrate the significant authority the FTC has to
address privacy and security concerns in apps and devices. In one more
example, FTC v. Frostwire, LLC, the settlement barred the company from
using default settings to cause inadvertent public sharing of files by
consumers and required clear and prominent disclosures of file sharing and
how to disable it.147
Yet, despite having the authority to launch investigations into medical
apps and wearables that are sharing information with data aggregators and
brokers, the FTC has “generally chosen to take action only when an app
developer [or device manufacturer] fails to disclose in advance that it will be
invading a person’s privacy.”148 Likewise, the FTC will not seek judgments
against companies that fully disclose their practices in their privacy policies,
terms of use, or other documents, because it would no longer be “unfair or
deceptive.”149
Under this enforcement strategy, the onus shifts from the company to
the consumer, who is then tasked with carefully reading complex privacy
policies. However, more than 80% percent of users do not always read their
143. Id. at 6.
144. Kitain, supra note 97, at 23.
145. Id.
146. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 1 (2013).
147. Andrews, supra note 181, at 448 (The FTC has also secured consent decrees against
Facebook, Snapchat, LabMD, and Wyndham Worldwide for similar violations).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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privacy policies and only 19% are aware of circumstances where their
personal data was used in a way they did not expect.150 Given these facts, the
FTC might not adequately protect users of wearables and mHealth apps from
having their medical information inappropriately shared, because privacy
policies can be deliberately confusing, overreaching, or present no
meaningful opportunity for individual choice.151 As mentioned previously,
the FTC has the authority to prosecute “deceptive and fraudulent” business
practices; however, the FTC has been selective in its enforcement.152 The
FTC has brought actions against clear acts of deception, such as by Trendnet
and Goldenshores, but has left a large segment of the market untouched with
apps that grant themselves overreaching permissions.153
E. Fair Information Practice Guidelines

In its 1998 report, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, the FTC
summarized widely accepted principles, known as “fair information practice
principles” (FIPPs), regarding the collection, use, and dissemination of
personal information.154 In May 2000, the FTC added to and refined these
principles, which included notice, choice, access, security, and
enforcement.155 For notice, “Web sites would be required to provide
consumers clear and conspicuous notice of their information practices.”156
For choice, “Web sites would be required to offer consumers choices as to
how their personal identifying information is used beyond the use for which
the information was provided (e.g., to consummate a transaction).”157 For
access, “Web sites would be required to offer consumers reasonable access
150. Report, Global Internet User Survey Summary Report, INTERNET SOC’Y, 448 (2012),
https://wayback.archiveit.org/9367/20170907075239/https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/GUIS-2012Infographic.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2020).
151. Id. at 449.
152. Supra note 146 at 449.
153. See Andrews, supra note 181, at 439. “Permissions authorize app developers to access
sensitive information, such as the ability to track the user’s location (18% of diabetes apps), record
audio (4%), read contacts on the phone (6%), and take pictures (11%).110 The permissions for
bipolar apps in our study included finding accounts on the device (25%), reading the user’s contacts
(8%), seeing their precise location (17%), modifying or editing the contents of the phone’s USB
storage (62%), recording audio (5%), and taking pictures or videos (13%).”
154. See Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, FTC, at 3 (1998),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv23a.pdf.
155. See Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace—A Report
to Congress, FTC (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacyonline-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commissionreport/privacy2000text.pdf.
156. Id. at 34.
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to the information a Web site has collected about them.” 158 For security,
“Web sites would be required to take reasonable steps to protect the security
of the information they collect from consumers.”159 For enforcement, the
FTC identified three types of measures: self-regulation by the information
collectors or an appointed regulatory body; private remedies that give civil
causes of action for individuals whose information has been misused to sue
violators; and government enforcement that can include civil and criminal
penalties levied by the government.160
Although theoretically appealing, FIPPs have often been an
unsuccessful approach to privacy issues.161 Users undergo a blitz of notices
and opportunities for generally limited choice.162 For many users, notices do
not serve a helpful purpose because they are either ignored or overly
complicated.163 Many users do not want to be burdened with impenetrable
choices when they are downloading an app. Some people avoid making
choices as to what data is collected and try to circumvent notices of such a
choice.164 Other people, when confronted with a choice, are ill-equipped to
make an informed decision.165 Ultimately, as Fred H. Cate argues, the
illusion of privacy under a FIPPs regime creates the worst of both worlds:
“privacy protection is not enhanced, individuals and businesses pay the cost
of bureaucratic laws, and we have become so enamored with notice and
choice that we have failed to develop better alternatives.” 166 On the other
hand, as to how credit information is gathered, shared, and used, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) assigns greater responsibility to the businesses
and less to the consumer.167 This makes sense because businesses are better
equipped to comply with guidelines than consumers.
Wearables present additional challenges to traditional notions of
privacy such as FIPPs. 168 Because many wearables are screenless or do not
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provide users the ability to interact in a meaningful way, users may have an
even more difficult time availing themselves of the notice and choice
model.169 To provide consent, it would likely have to be through an
associated app that is located on another device.170
F. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) generally has broad
authority to regulate products marketed to the public. Unfortunately, it has
done little to protect the privacy of people who use wearable mHealth
devices.
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), a medical device is
“any product intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or of the body.”171
The FDCA provides that “device” does not include “a software function that
is intended … for maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle and is
unrelated to the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a
disease or condition.”172 With technological developments in wearables and
mHealth apps, the FDA has clarified that mobile phone applications will be
regulated if they are intended: (1) to be used as an accessory to a regulated
medical device; or (2) to transform a mobile platform into a regulated
medical device.173
In the last decade, the FDA has developed a Digital Health Program
that, according to the agency, balances “the benefits and risks to patients.”174
The FDA explains it has “focused [the agency’s] oversight on mobile
medical apps to only those that present higher risk to patients, while
choosing not to enforce compliance for lower risk mobile apps.”175 Likewise,
it states it will not focus on “technologies that receive, transmit, store or
display data from medical devices,” or “products that only promote general
wellness.”176 In other words, apps that work with higher risks devices, e.g.,
implanted devices, would be categorized as “high-risk,” whereas an Apple
Watch or Fitbit would be a “low-risk” device.
In July 2017, the FDA released its Digital Health Innovation Action
Plan, again stating the agency does not plan to regulate “low risk general
wellness products.” The plan explains the agency’s direction over the
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(h).
172. 21 U.S.C.A. § 360j.
173. Durkin, infra note 156, at 284.
174. Digital Health Innovation Action Plan, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2017), at 2, available
at https://www.fda.gov/media/106331/download.
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coming year to “encourage digital health innovation.” The plan mapped out
three areas of action: (1) issuing new guidance regarding the regulation of
digital health, (2) developing new regulatory approaches to the oversight of
digital health, and (3) building expertise on digital health within the
agency.177
The FDA explains that its hands-off approach is rooted in getting
products to consumers quickly and not stifling innovation.178 The FDA
stated, “For the American people to see the full potential of digital health
technologies, FDA must lean forward and adapt our processes.”179 As such,
the FDA has limited the scope of its regulation to “medical devices,” under
the FDCA, used in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, or prevention of disease.180 To determine whether a product is a
medical device, the FDA will consider how a manufacturer intends its
product to be used.181 This regulatory scheme creates a loophole between
what a manufacturer intends its product to be used for and how it is actually
used.182 According to one critic, “consumer access, self-treatment, the
unauthorized practice of medicine, and the actual use [of mHealth apps] have
coalesced into a state where technological advancement encourages selftreatment and the unauthorized practice of medicine.”183
A study led by Lori Andrews, in Privacy a New Privacy Paradigm,
compared what apps’ privacy policies say what they do with the users’
information and what they actually do with the information.184 With large
amounts of money being offered by data brokers for sensitive medical data,
unscrupulous developers have entered the market to seize on the
opportunity.185 Because medical apps provide users the opportunity for self-
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treatment, a poorly designed app can have deadly consequences. Andrews’
study found that 43% of diabetes apps were designed for disease
management and 19% allowed the user to calculate insulin doses and the
amount of carbohydrates consumed.186 Thirty-five percent of the bipolar
apps examined in the study similarly tracked medications, vitals, or
symptoms.187 Forty-one percent told the user what dose of a drug to take or
what other action the user should undertake to treat her condition. 188
Ultimately, the study found that apps offered unproven treatments. Several
apps aimed at treating bipolar disorder actually discouraged users from going
to the doctor or taking recommended medications, and instead urged users
to listen to southing sounds, which were advertised as “Doctor’s #1
recommendation for mental illness treatment.”189 Of the apps that were
supposed to warn about drug interactions, 67% failed to recognize a
potentially fatal interaction.190 None of the medication tracking apps gave a
warning when a tester input a lethal 6000 mg dose of lithium – one of the
apps even brought up an advertisement offering to sell the user more
lithium.191 Other studies have shown deficiencies in asthma apps, diabetes
apps, and other medical apps.192
With wearables having an increasing presence, apps that work with
wearables will follow. Without regulation, the apps will continue to have
potentially harmful – or even deadly – effects. Self-regulation of the market
is not protecting consumers or creating a market conducive to innovation.
Legitimate wearable technology, and the mHealth apps based on them, are
being forced to compete against free apps that physically endanger users and
negatively impact the overall market. Also, if too many consumers have
negative experiences with wearables and related apps, they are less likely to
use other wearables and apps and would not recommend them. Ultimately,
the few bad apples would spoil the bunch.
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Part IV: Potential for Improving Health Outcomes
A. Precision Medicine

Medical progress is not much different than other forms of progress: it
requires learning from one’s successes and mistakes. Not having complete
information makes it difficult to learn from either. Wearables have the
potential to harness technology for medical research that could provide
doctors with more complete data sets.193 In one study of stroke patients,
informed consent was obtained from only 39.3% of patients in phase one and
50.6% in phase two.194 This led to selection bias: the patients that were
impaired or seriously ill did not provide written consent.195 The point is not
to dispense with the opt-in consent requirement for medical research, but to
identify ways to increase opt-in consent rates. Wearables may be part of the
solution.
In 2017, Stanford launched a study of whether a mobile app that uses
data from a heart-rate pulse sensor, on the Apple Watch, could identify atrial
fibrillation.196 Atrial fibrillation is an irregular and often rapid heart rate that
can increase risk of strokes, heart failure, and other heart-related
complications.197 The condition often remains undiagnosed because many
people do not experience symptoms. 198 The virtual study had an
unprecedented 400,000 enrolled participants.199 One key finding of the study
was the following: “Comparisons between irregular pulse-detection on
Apple Watch and simultaneous electrocardiography patch recordings
showed the pulse detection algorithm (indicating a positive tachogram
reading) has a 71 percent positive predictive value.”200 Loyd Minor, MD,
Dean of Stanford School of Medicine, said, “Atrial fibrillation is just the
beginning, as this study opens the door to further research into wearable
technologies and how they might be used to prevent disease before it strikes
— a key goal of precision health.”201
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The FDA defines precision medicine as, “an innovative approach to
tailoring disease prevention and treatment that takes into account differences
in people’s genes, environment, and lifestyles.”202 Precision medicine has
been called the optimistic marriage of high-tech and high-touch.203 Whereas
medicine has been traditionally directed towards the general population,
wearables create opportunities for continuous health monitoring for
individual patients. Wearables might be joined by implantables, ingestibles,
and invisibles.204
As technology advances, so does security and privacy concerns.
Wearables and implantables can be hacked.205 In 2017, the FDA released a
Safety Communication warning that there were 465,000 implanted
pacemakers requiring a firmware update to address cybersecurity
vulnerabilities.206 Indeed, mHealth may have the ability to revolutionize
healthcare, but if not done correctly, it may also place many lives and
livelihoods in jeopardy. Because privacy and security will be crucial in
developing trust with consumers, these principles should be a forethought
rather than an afterthought. In doing so, more users will opt-in, creating a
more complete data set that the medical field can rely on. Nonetheless, this
takes trust. As precision medicine takes its first steps, it should keep in mind
that trust is fragile and should not be overlooked in favor of convenience.
B. COVID-19

The world is fighting the COVID-19 pandemic.207 As of September 21,
2021, the John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center reported 229,517,471
cases, 4,707,807 deaths, and 223 countries with confirmed cases of COVID-
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19.208 One of the challenges affecting the medical community’s ability to
contain the virus is the long incubation period, ranging from 5-14 days.209
During this time, infected individuals can go without symptoms, which
means the person may unknowingly spread the virus.210
Wearables have been used to detect symptoms of COVID-19.211 For
example, Cardiogram is an app on Apple Watches that serves as a heart rate
monitor. Through its Sleeping BPM function, it can “help users become
aware of how their body is responding to symptoms of the flu or other
illnesses, including COVID-19.”212 The developers caution that the app is
not a replacement for medical diagnostic tests.213
On the other hand, there are fears that such monitoring of personal
health information could produce a long-term problem for a short-term
solution.214 Historically, during times of emergencies, governments have
stripped away social liberties and have not relinquished their emergency
powers afterwards.215 As Edward Snowden states, “the funny thing is [for
the government] the emergency never ends; it becomes normalized.” 216
There are fears that when this emergency is over, the expanded capabilities
and data sets given to businesses and government will be kept and used for
small-time criminality, political gain, and maintaining power dynamics.217
For reasons previously mentioned in this paper, the information collected by
wearables provides access to information that a user may be unaware of that
could result in discrimination. 218 After the virus is defeated, companies and

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Mike Peterson, Apple Watch users can monitor their body’s response to COVID-19, flu
with
Cardiogram
app,
APPLEINSIDER
(Mar.
19,
2020),
https://appleinsider.com/articles/20/03/19/apple-watch-users-can-monitor-their-bodys-responseto-covid-19-flu-with-cardiogram-app.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Shelter in Place with Shane Smith & Edward Snowden (Full Episode), VICE NEWS (Apr.
10,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=861&v=k5OAjnveyJo&feature=emb_logo.
215. With the Bush-era warrantless wiretapping program, only part of it was shut down, while
the other parts have been repeatedly rolled over; see Ellen Nakashima, Legal memos released on
Bush-era justification for warrantless wiretapping, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memos-released-on-bush-erajustification-for-warrantless-wiretapping/2014/09/05/91b86c52-356d-11e4-9e920899b306bbea_story.html.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Singer, supra note 42.

Winter 2022

PRIVACY IN WEARABLES

51

data brokers, may continue to hold this information and use it for financial
gains due to the overreaching privacy policies.
Both political parties in the United States have introduced legislation
on COVID-19 tracing and tracking, but they remain divided on preemption
of state law and private right of action.219 In May 2020, Senator Roger
Wicker introduced the “COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020,”
but the bill died in committee.220 Also, Senator Mark Warner introduced the
“Public Health Emergency Privacy Act,” but it lacks bipartisan support. 221
In all, the political stalemate of Congress coupled with concerns of
preemption and a private right of action make the passage of meaningful
COVID privacy legislation unlikely. Without such legislation, the current
laws do not provide adequate privacy protection for users of advanced
technologies that predict diagnosis.

Part V: Conclusion
Traditionally, patients disclosed medical information in a hermetic
manner: disclosure was done with just a doctor or other trusted individuals.
For the doctor, there are a number of overlapping regulations that protect a
patient’s medical information.
The calculus changes in light of how wearables and mHealth apps
gather, use, and share medical information. Initially, the transaction may
seem innocuous, i.e., a user downloads an app to monitor steps, health, and
so on. This information may seem harmless. However, by gathering multiple
data sets and creating a user profile with a myriad of data points, predictive
algorithms and artificial intelligence can try to predict the likely behavior or
health status of an individual. These patterns are valuable to insurance
companies, employers, and others.
Currently, there is a patchwork of sectoral privacy laws, but a general
federal privacy law is lacking. Wearables are not sufficiently covered.
Proponents of continuing this hands-off approach argue that regulations
would stifle innovation.222 However, the FTC and FDA have both taken a
hands-off approach, which has allowed bad actors to participate. With wellcrafted regulations, these bad actors would be removed from the pool and
the right kind of innovation would flourish. Regulation would actually
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encourage innovation because legitimate actors would not have to compete
with bad actors. Additionally, user trust and confidence would be
encouraged, which would result in a larger pool of participants.
Consumer trust is pivotal to increasing user participation. Wearable
technology is both exciting and scary. Wearables have the potential to be a
truly innovative technology that can facilitate medical progress, help people,
and progress society forward. This potential must be weighed against the
dangers of the sensitive information that wearables create. For these reasons,
trust must be a forethought and not an afterthought.
In September 2014, Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, released a letter
addressing privacy concerns.223 In drafting this letter, Tim Cook created a
“gold standard” of self-regulated privacy policy for a company. It argues that
privacy should be baked in. It also criticizes companies that collect, share,
and use personal data as their business model. To be fair, Apple is in a
position to make these assertions because its business model is not selling
ads, like Google or Facebook; rather, its business model is to sell devices.224
On the other hand, Apple’s devices host the apps that collect and sell user
information, which Apple directly profits from. As of 2018, Apple made $42
billion from App Store downloads.225 Nevertheless, Apple attempts to foster
trust with its consumers by highlighting privacy concerns.
Trust has a direct impact on sales. With COVID-19, there has been a
surge in sales of desktop cameras to enable video conferencing.226 In 2018,
Facebook released Portal, an A.I.-powered camera with a video-chat
screen.227 To address privacy concerns, Facebook incorporated a kill switch
for the camera, provided a cover for the lens, encrypted video calls, and built
the camera’s A.I. into the device itself.228 Yet, despite high demand for
desktop cameras during COVID, demand for Facebook’s Portal remained
low.229 This is likely attributable to the healthy distrust that users have with
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Facebook. Users are reluctant to purchase a Facebook Portal, which has
some solid privacy features, because they do not trust Facebook with their
private information. Facebook Portal illustrates the importance of trust.
Because of the sensitivity of medical information, and the long-term
and irrevocable nature of disclosing it, medical information should not be
commercially sold. There is a wealth of potential in medical innovation as
medicine shifts from general care to precision healthcare. Users must have
assurances that their medical information will not be sold or result in
discrimination. For now, users are largely unaware of the long-term
consequences and risks associated with data collection, so they may be
willing to trade their privacy for convenience. However, as public sentiment
shifts because of growing privacy awareness, such transactions are less likely
to occur.
The current sectoral legal framework does not suit the need to ensure
innovation of wearables. HIPAA fails for two reasons. First, it only regulates
medical information disclosed by a medical provider or someone that does
business with them. Therefore, it does not apply to most commercial
transactions. Second, there is no private cause of action to enforce it. For a
HIPAA violation, a covered entity is fined by the government, but there is
no redress for the patient. As for COPPA, its scope is limited to children
under the age of 13.
Administrative agencies could regulate wearables and medical
information, but they will need more statutory authority to do so. The FTC
might make more sense, because the FDA can more likely regulate devices
or wearables that are prescribed by a doctor. Whether the FTC has the
authority to broadly regulate wearables, outside of deceptive practices, is
unclear.
In all, because the relationship between wearables and consumers is
particularly exciting but also scary, companies should tread lightly for fear
of stifling their long-term goals for short-term gains. The lost trust a user has
once their medical information is made public is irreparable and will,
ultimately, stifle innovation. To allow good actors to continue to innovate,
bad actors must be regulated.
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